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Evidence from Plan Data
ABSTR ACT
401(k) plans differ from traditional employer-sponsored pension plans in that employees are
permitted to make pre-tax contributions and the employer may match pai-t of the contribution.
Since participation in these plans is voluntary, the sensitivity of participation and contributions
to plan characteristics -notablythe employer matching rate --willplay a critical role in
retirement saving.
Using plan level data from Form 5500s filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service, I
find that there is potential for expanding retirement saving through 401(k) plans although there
is evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced their attractiveness. Annual employee
contributions were reduced by about 4 percent compared to the prior year after controlling for
employer match rates.
A simple model of employee contributions predicts that participation should increase with
the match rate, and that, under reasonable assumptions, contributions will increase as well, but
can eventually fall at higher match rates. I find evidence of both these effects. A .05increase
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and NBERI. Introduction
Employer—sponsored pre—tax savings plans, often called
401(k) plans for the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section that
permits such plans for private corporations, differ from
traditional employer—sponsored pension and retirement plans in
two important ways. First, employees are permitted to makepre-
tax contributions to the plan; the employer may or may not also
contribute.1 Second, once an employee is eligible, actual
participation in 401(k) arrangements is generally voluntary.
401(k) plans are increasingly offered as a retirement
benefit. Between May 1983 and May 1988, the availability of
these plans increased by more than 3 times. The proportion of
all civilian workers who were offered such arrangements (either
exclusively or in addition to another employer plan) increased
from 7% to 24%.2 In a 1990 survey by Hewitt Associates, 93
percent of the 944 major U.S. employers surveyed offered benefits
in this form. These companies, which make up 89 percent of the
Fortune 500 and 54 percent of the Fortune 100, offered some
matching 79 percent of the time. Fortune Magazine estimates that
$130 billion was invested in 401(k)s in l990.
1Similar plans for certain nonprofit institutions and state
and local government are authorized under XRC section 403(b). In
addition public—sector employees may participate in arrangements
under section 457.
2Employee Benefit Issue Brief Issue Brief, September 1989,
Number 94.
3See Management Accounting April (1991)concurrent with the growth of 401(k) plans hasbden a
decline in employee participation in retirement plans.
Participation rates haVe fallen even as overall coverage has
increased.4 Researchers have speculated that covered—worker
participation may have fallen due to an increase in these
voluntary employer plans, as part of the documented movement from
defined benefit coverage to defined contribution coverage.5
Even and Macpherson (1992) find that employees are less likely to
participate in a new plan if it is a 401(k) plan.
Since participation is voluntary in 401(k) plans, unlike
in traditional pension plans, the sensitivity of participation to
plan characteristics —notablythe employer matching rate ——will
play a critical role in retirement saving.I use plan level data
from Form 5500s filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) •to analyze participation in and employee contributions to
401(k) plans. A second focus of the analysis is to determine if
the more restrictive contribution limits, nondiscrimination
requirements, and lower marginal personal tax rates of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) have affected participation and
contributions in these plans.6
The analysis indicates that the average ahnual employee
contribution fell by about 4 percent following TRA86 (about $63
4See Piacentini (1989)
5See Kruse (1991),andBeller and Lawrence (1992)
6Poterba, Vent!, and Wise (1992) document the decline in
Individual Retirement Account (IRks) contributions in the post—
TRk86 environment.
2per participant and $97,000 per plan) .Theplan's match rate
positively influences both participation (the number of active
accounts) and employee contributions, although its effect on
participation is small. Starting from an initial match rate of
.10, a .05 increase in the match rate is estimated to increase
contributions per participant by from one to five percent. Total
saving (combined employee and employer contributions) is
estimated to increase from six to 10 percent.
The next section briefly reviews the legislative background
of 401(k) plans, in part to demonstrate lawmakers' commitment to
equalizing saving opportunities across income groups and the
complex rules that commitment entails. Section 3 presents a
simple model of the individual's saving decision as a function of
the plan match rate. Section 4 presents the empirical findings,
and section 5 concludes.
2. Legislative background7
The preferential tax treatment accorded more recently
developed defined contribution retirement plans, such as
individual retirement accounts (IRA5), simplified employee
pension (SEP5), section 401(k)-arrangements, and Keogh plans for
the self—employed, indicates a continued interest on the part of
7The information in this section comes from a variety of
sources, including practitioner journals. A useful general
reference is Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Proura1fl, Employee
Benefit Research Institute, 4th edition, 1990.
3policy makers in encouraging retirement savings.8 This
preferential treatment is contingent on the employer's compliance
with the nondiscrimination provision governing employee coverage
and benefit levels ahd the rules set out in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
The Revenue Act of 1978 first authorized employers to offer
401(k) plans, also referred to as cash or deferred arrangements
(CODAs), but their use increased dramatically after the. IRS
issued clarifying regulations in 1981. In 1983, 4.4 million
employees were reported as participating in 401(k) plans. By
1988, that number grew to 15.7 million participants.9 401(k)
plan participants made up over 25 percent of all participants in
primary defined contribution plans in 1987, compared to 5.7
percent in 1983.10 They comprise an even larger fraction of
participants in secondary and tertiary plans.
Part of the popularity of 401(k) plans may be due to the
relative ease with which employees can save. An employer—
sponsored salary reduction agreement involves less work for the
8some defined contribution plansare structured as "thrift" or
"savings" plans. In these plans, the workers' deposits are made
from after—tax income.
9See Andrews (1992) and Poterba,Venti, and Wise (1992) for
details of the expansion in 401(k) plans.
10There are several types of defined contributionplans: money
purchase plans (where employer contributions are stated as a
percentage of employee salary)target benefit plans (where
Contributions are scaled to achieve a specified retirement
benefit)profit sharing plans (including 401(k) arrangements)
thrift plans, stock bonus plans, andemployee stock option plans
(ESOPS) which traditionally invest in employer's securities.
4participant than another popular saving plan ——theIndividual
Retirement Account (IRA).11With thematching provision and no
adjustedgross income limit, 401(k) plans have a greater
potential for pre-tax saving than do IRAs. While the Tax Reform
Actof 1986 (TRA86) reduced contribution limits for both IRAsand
401(k)plans, the 401(k) plan remains the more generous tax—
deferred saving vehicle.
In 401(k) plans, a covered employeenay elect to have the
employer make payments as contributions to a trust under theplan
on behalf of the employee, or to the employee directly in cash.
Any amounts deferred at the employee's election (called elective
contributions) are considered employer contributions to the
trust, for which the employer receives a deduction; The
employee, in turn, excludes these deferred amounts from
income.12
Bothemployer and employee nay make contributions to 401(k)
plans. Employers may make contributions for the employee, whether
or not the employee contributes to the plan, ormay match a
fraction of the employee contribution. In a typicalplan, the
employer contributes 50 cents for each dollar the employeesaves,
11Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1992) document that the 401(k)
participation rate of eligible families is more than twice as high
as participation in the IRAprogram.
12With the exception of one state -Pennsylvania-
contributionsto 401(k) plans are also exempt from state income
tax. However, most states require employers to count an employee's
elective deferral as wages in computing state unemployment
insurance taxes. Some municipalities also treat elective deferrals
as wages for local income tax purpose. Contributions are subject
to social security tax.
5up to six percent of compensation.13 Beyond 6 percent of pay,
employees usually may add unmatched contributions up to
legislative limits. Plans may also be established without any
employer contributions.
Because the saying is tax—favored, IRS rules restrict
participant access to the funds. Elective deferrals may
withdrawn without penalty before age 59 1/2 only upon retirement,
plan termination, separation from service, financial hardship, or
disability.'4 A 10 percent tax is imposed on lump—sum
distributions paid to individuals before age 59 1/2 (in addition
to income tax owed).15 TRA86 permits one-time election of 5—
year forward averaging for a lump—sum distribution received from
a 401(k) plan after age 59 1/2.16
Since tax—deferred saving differentially benefits higher
income workers, 401(k) plan regulations include pre—tax
13The GAO (1988a) reports that 64 percent ofplans with more
than 50 employees offer a match rate of 50 percent or less. Plans
which match up to a larger fraction of salary tend to have lower
matching rates.
141RS regulations define qualified financialhardship for early
withdrawal purposes.
'51f participant takes anearly withdrawal but buys an annuity,
there is no excise tax —justregular income tax. There is also a
15 percent excise tax on distributions to an individual inexcess
of specified limits (now $150,000per year or $750,000 if lump
sum).
thedistribution is received in the form of employer
securities or retirement bonds, there is additional favorable tax treatment —thenet unrealized appreciation is not taxed on
distribution but is taxed only when sold. IRA, 403(b), andXeogh
lump—sums (if received for reasons other thandeath) are not
eligible for this treatment.
6contribution limits and nondiscrimination provisions in addition
to those in ERISA which apply to all pension plans. The main
purpose behind the more stringent regulations imposed in TRA86,
described below, is to ensure a more equal distribution of
benefits. Contribution limits and nondiscrimination tests will
be reviewed briefly here; see Andrews (1992) and piacentini
(1989) for discussion of the loan and withdrawal provisions.
Contribution limits
Prior to TRA86, section 415 of the IRC limited before—tax
contributions to the lesser of 25 percent of employee
compensation or $30,000. After TRA86, for taxable years
beginningafter January 1, 1987, the maximum permitted annual
before—tax or elective deferral is $7000, indexed to inflation
beginning in 1998. In the 1991 tax year, employees could
contribute up to $8,475 to a qualified plan.
After—tax or "voluntary" contributions on the part of the
employee are not subject to the $7,000 limit for elective
contributionsbut do count against the overall section 415 limits
of $30,000, or 25% of compensation from all plans.'
Nondiscriminationrules, discussed below, may prevent some
employees from contributing to the limit even if they want to.
'TEarnings on after-tax contributions are not taxed until
distribution and some employers will match them. If the plan is
organized as a profit—sharing plan, the limit is furtherreduced to
15percent of gross salary.
7Nondiscrimination tests
Nondiscrimination tests limit the amount that highly
compensated employees nay elect to defer in relation to other
employees. These compliance tests must be carried out on an
annual basis. In general, a highly compensated employee is
anyone who owns more than 5 percent of a company, or anyone
earning more than a certain indexed income threshold. The exact
level of the threshold depends on factors such as whether or not
an employee was an officer in the company or was a member of the
"top paid" group of employees.16
Prior to TRA86, the actual deferral percentage (ADP) test
required that a plan sponsor compare the average percentage
contributed by the highest paid 1/3 participant group against the
lowest paid 2/B's. Generally, the average percentage for the
highest-paid third could exceed the average percentage for the
lower 2/as by 3 percentage points.
TRA86 tightened these requirements and added a parallel test
for employee after—tax and employer matching contributions ——the
actual contribution percent (ACP). Under the revised ADP test,
the average percentage of compensation (taking into account
employer contributions) deferred by highly compensated employees
may not exceed the greater of: 125% of the average deferral
percentage for all other eligible employees, or the lesser of
181n 1988, the relevant threshold ranged from $47,011.50 to
$78,353.Other, potentially more stringent, nondiscrimination
requirements may apply where employer contributions, after—tax
employee contributions, or multiple plan participation are present.
See flloyee Benefit Notes, March1991, Volume 12 Number 3.
a200% of the average deferral percentage of all othereligible
employees or such average plus two percentage points. The AC?
mirrors this test, except for the substitution of "actual
contribution percentage" for "actual deferral percentage."19
If a plan fails either the AD? or ACP test in any given plan
year, certain other contributions may be included to help pass
these tests. For purposes of passing the AD? test, the
regulations provide that the employer may include qualified
nonelective contributions (QNCs) and qualified matching
contributions (QMACs) in the AD? calculation. For thepurposes
of passing the AC? test, the employer may include QNCs or
elective contributions in the AC? calculation. QNC5 are
nonforfeitable, nonelective employer contributions that are
subject to the distribution restrictions applicable to Section
401(k) elective contributions. QMACS are nonforfeitable employer
matching contributions that are subject to the same restrictions.
These are sometimes called "helper" contributions or a "safe
harbor. ,,?G
19Forexample, if the non—highly compensated group has
contributions (by both employee and employer) of less than 2
percent of gross income, the highly compensated group is limited to
twice that ADP percentage. If the non—highly compensated
contribute between 2 and 8 percent, the highly paidgroup may
contribute that AD? plus 2 percent.If the lower paid group
contributes 8 percent or more, the highly paid group is limited to
1.25 times that rate.
2040l(k) "restructuring" can also be used to pass n?n—
discrimination tests. Instead of comparing, on a plan—wide basis,
average deferrals by highly compensated employees with others, the
plan is restructured for testing purposes into groups of
9A 10 percent excise tax is imposed on the employer for
excess amounts remaining in the plan 2 1/2 months after the close
of the plan year. Further, the plan may be disqualified if
excess amounts are not corrected by the end of the following plan
year. Excess contributions may be recharacterized (within 2 1/2
months of the close of the plan year) as after—tax employee
contributions, to the extent required to satisfy the ADP test.
Excess amounts may also be corrected by distributing them to the
highly compensated employees to whom they relate. Correction of
excess amounts may also be made by contributing additional helper
QNC5 or QMACs.21
These nondiscrimination tests require an ex—post adjustment
of the effective match rate for some participants. If, at the
end of the plan year, higher-income workers have tipped the
balance of the plan, the sponsor may make additional
contributions to lower—income participants' accounts. For some
participants, the marginal plan match rate may be a lower bound
on the plan's generosity.
In the next section I analyze a simple model of employee
contributions based on utility maximization. The model predicts
that participation should increase with the match rate, and that,
participants.Separate plans then cover employees at different
locations, or job categories. In September 1990, the IRS issued
amendments which state that the restructuring rules require that
the employee group share some common attribute other than that of
a similar deferral percentage.
21See Faber, Journal of Pension Planning and Compliance, Winter
1990, part 1.
10under reasonable assumptions, contributions will increase as
well, but may eventually fall at higher match rates. These
predictions are tested in section 4.
3. A simple model of 401(k) contributions
This section presents a model of the individual's decision
to save in a 401(k) plan, conditional on the plan's match
rate.22 Since ERISA sets overall eligibility parameters, and
the IRSsetslimits on overall contributions, the most critical
dimension by which 401(k) plans differ is the match rate chosen
by the sponsor.23
Assuming separability of saving s and consumption c for
simplicity, an employee maximizes utility over s and c according
to
max U1(s) +U2(c). (1)
nO, c0
subject to c+sy
The employee faces exogenous matching rate m in a 401(k) plan.
Total savings s will be x(l+m), where x is the amount
contributed. Total consumption c is then y—x where y is income.
The employee maximizes utility by choosing x, the amount of the
22Most plans have a positive match rate.The GAO (l988b)
reports 51 percent of fins which sponsor plans provide some
matching contribution. Most participants face a positive match
rate.Even and Macpherson (1992) report that 83 percent of
participantsin a primary 401(k)planinclude employer
contributions or offer matching contributions.
23Ease of loans and hardship withdrawals are other dimensions
by which plans may differ. But the IRS and Department of Labor set
overall limits with respect to these as well.
11401(k) contribution.
max U1((l+m)x) + U2((y—x)). (2) x0
The employee will participate in the plan (i.e. theoptimal contribution
> 0) if
au1 act 3 (1+m) (0) (y)
or,when (l+m) is greater than the ratio of the marginalutility
from an extra dollar of consumption to the marginalutility of
the first dollar of saving.
Assuming that the employee chooses to participate, the
first—order condition for the optimal employee contributionx is
used below to illustrate how bontributionsvary with the matching
rate in.For notational simplicity, define x(m)x(m). The
first—order condition which x(m) solves is
3u act (4 — —1(y—x(rn)).o. as
Differentiating(4) with respect to in yields
3x auU2ax (5) (1+m)—1- [x+(1+m)—j +__L
+
12Rewriting,
3u aLl 32U (1+m)2—+ —.1)—— + x(1+m) ___a-j (6) 323c2 3m 3s 3s2
BecauseU1 and U2 are assumed to be concave, their second
derivatives with respect to s and c are negative. Therefore, the
term multiplying ax/am in (6) is positive. Because 3U1/as >0
and 820i/3s2 c 0, it follows that
-[(+)+C-)). (7)




To illustrate the condition in (8) ,considertwo examples.
Example 1: TJ(s,c) =alog(l+s)+U2(c)
If t.12(c) =c,participation occurs when (l+m)a >1,that is,
participation is increasing in in.Checkingthe contribution—




13Contributions are also increasing with the match rate in this
example.
Example 2: U(s,c) as —(/3/2)52÷ U2(c)
aua s, j3.
Again, if 02(c) =c,participation occurs when a > l/(1+m).
Contributions in example 2 will increase with inwhena —f3s>3s,
or when s <a/(2fl)This example predicts that x will be
positively related to inforsmall in,andnegatively related to in
for larger m.
The next section summarizes 401(k) plan statistics from Form
5500 filings, and estimates the empirical relationship between
plan match rates and participation and contributions.
4. Empirical findings
The Form 5500 is filed annually with the IRS by all sponsors
of pension plans with :mOre than 100 participants.24 These
reports included data on plan eligibility, participation,
employment, administrative cost, distributions, and
contributions.25t use data from the 1986 plan year which
precedes the revision of rules in TRA86, and from plan year 1987
24A Form 5500—C is requiredevery three years of all plans with
fewer than 100 participants.
25See Belier and Lawrence (1992) for further detail on the Form
5500 data.
14which followed the changes.26 I also use data from plan year
1985 to construct instrumental variables used in the estimation
below.
According to IRS rules, all contributions to the 401(k) plan
are officially made by the employer. However, the Form 5500 asks
for a breakdown of contributions, and 70 percent of plans report
employee and employer contributions separately. Plans for which
both contributions are reported comprise my sample.27
About 63 percent of plans in the sample began after 1982;
the remaining 37 percent of plans are converted thrift plans.
Forty—one percent of plans below to manufacturing firms, 17
percent to firms in services, 15 percent to finance, insurance,
and real estate, and between 5 and 6 percent to transportation
and communication, wholesale trade, and retail trade.
Summary statistics for plans in 1985, 1986, and 1987 are
presented in Table 1. In 1987, the average employee contribution
was $1572, with a corresponding average employer contribution of
$875 for a total of $2447 per participant. This average suggests
that the TRA86 limit of $7000 on pre—tax contributions is
unlikely to be binding for most participants.
I construct the plan match rate as the ratio of reported
26Unfortunately, the definition of active participant was
changed for the 1988 and 1989 plan years so that data from years
will not be comparable. The definition was corrected in the 1990
plan year.
27About 10 percent of plans report employee contributions only.
These are probably converted thrift or savings plans where only the
employee is intended to contribute. The remaining 20 percentof
plans attribute all contributions to the employer.
15employer contributions to employee contributions. The match rate
averaged .729 in 1987, and is virtually the same in prior years.
This average match rate will differ from reported marginal rates.
A 1988 Government Accounting Office (GAO, 1988a) survey of 401(k)
plans reports that 64 percent of large employers match at a rate
of $.50 or less. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (PVW, 1992) find with
the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances that almost 40 percent of
participants report a match rate between 0 and 10 percent, and
another 25 percent face a rate less than or equal to 50 percent.
This calculated average match rate can be reconciled with
these lower marginal rates by recognizing that employer
contributions reported on the Form 5500 include any flatper
participant contribution made by the employer, or any helper
contribution the employer made to pass the ADP or ACP anti-
discrimination tests. So, while the calculated match rate
exceeds the marginal incentive facing each saver, it may be a
better indicator of overall plan generosity.
The GAO (1988a) reports a participation ratio of 62 percent
which is the fraction of eligible employees who made
contributions.t construct a measure of participation as the
number of active accounts divided by the number of those eligible
to participate. An active account isany existing 401(k) account
-acontribution need not have been made that plan year. This
participation rate averaged over 86 percent in each of the three
years. Administrative costs per participant averaged about $102,
16plan assets averaged $13,222 per participant, and plans
distributed $1388 per participant.
Tables 2—4 present cumulative frequencies for the
participation rate, the average employee contribution, and
average plan match rate. Most plans report well over 90 percent
participation. About seventy percent of participants contribute
$2000 on average in each year. Fifty—eight percent of plans have
an average matching rate of 50 percent or less, 80 percent
average 1.00 or less. Most of the econometric analysis focuses
on plans with a match rate less than or equal to 1 as there are
clear structural differences between contributions and match
rates for rates greater than 1.
The participation equation to be estimated is
prate = fl2d1987 + /33log(l+m) + Ø4(firzn size)
+ fl5(firm size)2 + j36(sole plan)
where prate is the number of active accounts divided by the
number of eligible employees. The match rate is transformed to
be log(1+m) 29 d1987 is a dummy variable for 1987, firm size is
measured as the log of total employees, and sole plan is a dummy
variable which indicates that the 401(k) plan is the only pension
plan offered.30
25unfortunately, the annual number of recipients is not
reported.
• This functional form has some desirable features. It starts
off at zero for m=O, increases almost linearly for small in, and the
rate of increase declines as in gets large.
30This characteristic is not directly reported on the Form
5500. Dan Belier at the Department of Labor calculates it from the
17The first column of Table 5 presents estimates of this
equation using OLSonthe pooled 1986 and 1987 data. The
estimates indicate that the participation rate fell by 0.6
percent between 1986 and 1987. Of course, TRA86 did not make it
more likely that active accounts would be closed. Rather,
reductions in marginal tax rates reduced the advantages of tax—
deferred saving and appears to have slowed new account formation.
The marginal effect of a change in the matching rate in is
found by dividing the estimated coefficient by (1+m)As is
predicted by the model in the previous section, increases in in
raiseparticipation. Beginning with a match rate of .10, for
example, a .05 increase in the match rate raises the
participation ratio by 0.0114, or by about 17 people in a plan of
average size. While the coefficient is statistically
significant, the measured effect is not large.
The firm size coefficients indicate that a ten percent
increase in the size of the finn reduces participation by 0.001
(evaluated at the 1987 mean firm size). The sole plan
coefficient indicates that they have a 0.007 higher participation
rate —about11 people —relativeto 401(k) plans which accompany
other pension plans.
Some plans may be more successful at encouraging their
employees to participate, or may have employees on average who
participate more than other plans. Table 5 also presents
estimates from a fixed effects regression to control for the
universe of pension plans.
18possibility that these plan unobservables are also correlated
with the match rate. That is, employers may offer lowermatching
rates if they have employees who like to save (or conversely, if
because of lower employee savings rates, the employer madelarger
helper contributions) .Controllingfor the time-constant
unobservables eliminates the statistical significance of the
match rate, and the direction of the effect is barely positive.
The marginal effect of fin size becomes positive but is still
small, indicating that a ten percent increase in firm size
increases participation by 0.002. D1987, the dummy for 1987,
remains negative but is not statistically significant. The
effect of TRA86 on participation appears to be negative but
small.
It appears that participation is unaffected by the match
rate once plan unobservables are controlled for. There are two
possible explanations for this. The first is that the measure of
participation (number of 401(k) accounts divided by active
participants) is too imprecise. The Form 5500 reports the total
number of existing accounts, not the number of new accounts or
accounts closed each year. Secondly, initial participation may
well be a function of plan unobservables, such as the effort of
an active benefits staff or the work force characteristics of the
particular firm.31
To test the prediction that contributions are positively
31The sample includes only one 401(k) planper firm, so the
fixed effects are also controlling for firm characteristics.
19related to the match rate, at least up to some point, the
following contribution equation is estimated:
log(ec) = + /32d1987+/331og(l+m)+$4(log(l+mfl2+/35(firm
size)
where ec is employee contributions per participant. The first
two columns of Table 6 report estimates from QLS on thepooled
1986 and 1987 data (column 2 is included to illustrate thestrong
negative relationship between the average employee contribution
and the match rate for match rates greater than1).
The pooled regression (column one) indicates that the
average employee contribution fell by 4.1 percent in 1987,
relative to pre—TRAS6 contributions. The effect isstatistically
significant, and amounts to about $64 per participant onaverage.
This is the combined effect of the drop inmarginal tax rates
between the two years which made tax—deterredsaving less
valuable, and the drop in the maximum allowable contribution. If
the more stringent anti—discrimination requirements forced
employers to increase contributions for lower—income employees,
the contributions were not largeenough to completely offset
these other factors.
As in the second example of section 3, employee
contributions initially increase then decrease with the match
rate. Both terms in log(l+m) are statistically significant.
Table 7 contains calculations of the marginal effect ofchanges
in the match rate on employee contributions andon total saving.
Beginning from a match rate of .05, an increase of .05 increases
20contributions by 1.18 percent, and saving (combined employee and
employer contribution) by 5.94 percent. This positive marginal
effect on contributions diminishes and becomes negative at a
match rate of .15. At this point, a .05 increase in the match
rate reduces employee contributions by .07 percent, but saving
still increases by 4.28 percent. At a match rate of.50,
however, even the marginal effects on saving become negative.
The estimates give unrealistic predictions beyond this point.
This effect of the match rate on employee contributions is
roughly consistent with the one piece of evidence we have from
individual data. Andrews (1992) finds with the 1988 Current
Population Survey (CE'S) that contributions are lower when an
employer match is provided (the CPS does not include the match
rate or the amount of the employer contribution).
Unlike with participation, firm size is positively related
to the contributions —aten percent increase in firm size
increases employee contribution by about 0.4 percent. It is
likely that larger firms would have a permanent benefits staff
which may facilitate employee contributions.
As with the participation estimates, it may be desirable to
control for plan unobservables. Fixed effects estimates are
presented in the third column of Table 6 to control for
unobservable plan or firm characteristics which may correlated
with the match rate. However, in the context of contributions,
straightforward fixed effects may not be correct. First
differencing the data to obtain the fixed effects estimates may
21induce a separate endogeneity problem if, within a plan across
time, high employee contributions lead to a lower match rate in
the following year. That is, the match rate in 1987 is
negatively correlated with error from the 1986 equation, as in
the equation below:
ec87 —ec=fi (matchrate87 —matchrate) +(u37
—uM).
But, fixed effects requires that the regressors in all time
periods be uncorrelated with the errors in all time periods (the
strict exogeneity assumption). It is difficult to sign the
potential bias, however, because of the function form of the
match rate; see Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict (1992) for a
related argument.
Fixed effects instrumental variables (FE—IV) allows future
matching rates to be correlated with past errors while
maintaining that the errors are uncorrelated with the match rate
in past and current years. As a robustness check, I calculated
match rates from the 1985 Form 5500 data, and used the 1985 and
1986 match rates as instruments for the regressor in the
differenced equation.32
The FE—IV estimates in the fourth column of Table 6 confirm
these suspicions. The coefficients on the match rate variables
accord with those in the pooled oLs regression, although both the
coefficients and standard errors have become much larger.
Calculations of the marginal effect of changes in the match rate
32The chi—squared test of the overidentifying restriction did
not come close to rejecting.
22on contributions and saving using these coefficients are
presented in Table 7. Using the FE—IV estimates, an increase in
the match rate of .05 from .05 increases contributions by 5.07
percent, and saving by 9.83 percent. The marginal effect remains
positive up to a match rate of .30. At a match rate of .35, a
.05 increase in the match rate reduces employee contributions
by -.67 percent, but saving increases by 3.03 percent. The
marginal effects on saving again become negative at a match rate
of .50.
These estimates could suffer from omitted variable bias if
firms trade off their 401(k) contributions against the wage bill
in total worker compensation.Woodbury and Hamermesh (1992)
provide some indirect evidence on this issue. The authors find
that the share of fringe benefits in total compensation is
negatively related to the tax—price of benefits. Montgomery,
Shaw, and Benedict (1992) find a one—for—one tradeoff between
wage compensation and defined benefit pensions, while most of the
rest of the literature finds that high pensions and wages go
together.33 If there were such a tradeoff for 401(k) pension
plans, then the (omitted) wages would be negatively correlated
with the match rate. Such a relationship is not likely to occur
in the case of 401(k) plans, however, since wage compensation and
the match rate must be determined before the amount of employee
contribution is revealed.
Both the pooled OLS and FE-IV estimates suggest the same
335ee Schiller and Weiss (1980).
23basic relationship between the match rate and employee
contributions. Average employee contributions initially rise
with the match rate, but at some match rate between .15 and .35,
contributions are reduced, although total saving increases. A
.05 increase in the matching rate at a low initial match
increases contributions from between 1 and 5 percent. The
estimates produce unrealistic predictions at match rates above
.50.
5. conclusion
Tabulations of the Form 5500 data indicate that there is
much potential for expanding retirement saving through 401(k)
plans. While participation rates are high, employee
contributions are well below allowable limits. There is evidence
as well that TRA86 reduced the attractiveness of saving through
401(k) plans. Estimates show no increase in the number of new
401(k) accounts in 1987, and annual employee contributions were
reduced by about 4 percent compared to the prior year after
controlling for employer match rates.
A simple model of employee contributions is presented which
predicts that participation should increase with the match rate,
and that, under reasonable assumptions, contributions will
increase as well, but may eventually fall at higher match rates.
I find evidence of both these effects. Participation is
positively related to the match rate, although the effect is
small. Average employee contributions initially rise with the
24match rate, but then fall at some match rate between .15 and .35,
although total saving increases. A .05 increase in the matching
rate is associated with one to five percent increase in employee
contributions.
401(k) plans have potential to increase retirement saving,
and it appears that encouraging employers to provide some
matching would increase participation and contributions.
However, if our concern is with saving for retirement, we should
be as concerned with the outflow from 401(k) plans as well as the
inflow. While there are penalties for early withdrawal, the
limited evidence we have suggests that over one—third of
individuals receiving lump—sum distributions from prior jobs
spend the entire amountY This potential for leakage needs to
be investigated before we encourage 401(k) plans as a retirement
saving vehicle.
See Employee Benefit Notes, Employee Benefit Research
Institute, Volume 12, No. 1, January 1991. Also see EBRI Issue
Brief No. 65, April 1987.
251 thank Dan Belier, Dan Hanerinesh, Jim Poterba, Jeff Wooldridge,
and seminar participants at Michigan State University for helpful
comments.
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Note: These are mean characteristics for 401(k) plans with more
than 100 participants. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
If a different number of observations other than that given in






Table 2: Plan participation rate cumulative_frequencies
1985 1986 1987
0.1 0.09 0.10 0.15
0.2 0.48 0.19 0.33
0.3 1.35 0.62 0.89
0.4 3.22 1.50 1.99
0.5 5.73 3.46 4.07
0.6 10.20 7.58 7.91
0.7 16.29 13.78 15.06
0.8 27.53 26.99 28.42
0.9 42.21 44.56 44.18








































100.00Table 4: Plan match rate cumulative frequencies
1985 1986 1987
.25 21.99 23.28 23.07
.50 57.81 59.00 57.65
.75 72.79 73.04 72.40
1.00 80.56 81.12 80.70
1.50 88.56 89.05 88.53
2.00 92.90 92.96 92.50
2.50 95.01 95.07 94.50
3.00 96.52 96.39 96.33
3.50 97.48 97.49 97.52
4.00 98.40 98.47 98.47







































Note: The r—spiared for the fixed effects estimation is from the
first—difference regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.


















































Cbs. 8202 1949 2723 1855
r—squared .0327 .1384 .1304 ————
Note: The dependent variable is the log(employee
contributions/participant). The r—sguared from the fixed effect
estimation is from the first—difference regression. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
31Note: inmatch rate, C =
Thesecalculations use the
column 4.
employee contribution, s =saving.
regression coefficients from Table 6,





















.50 —0.7852 —0.393% —0.1185 0.59%
Note:in =matchrate, c =employeecontribution, s =saving. These ca1cu1atjns use the regressioncoefficients from Table 6, column 1.
Table 8. Marginal effects of the matchrate using FE—tv estimates
I alog(c)/am
in =.05 1.0143
% A C
for m=. 05
flog(s)/am % As
5.07%
for £m=.05
.10
.15
0.7584 3.79%
1.9667 9.83%
0.5337 2.67%
1.6675 8.34%
.20
.25
.30
.35
.50
0.3356 1.68%
1.4033 7.02%
0.1602 0.08%
1.1689 5.84%
0.0044 0.02%
0.9602 4.80%
—0.1345 —0.67%
0.7736 3.87%
—0.7041 —3.52%
0.6062
—0.0374
3.03%
32